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FILE

*Training 3-1*

DD/S 69-5241

19 NOV 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller

SUBJECT : Career Training Program

Attached is the proposal dated 12 November 1969 from the Director of Training for the revision of the Career Training Program. No distribution of this proposal has been made except to the Deputies' representatives who participated in the drafting of this proposal. I am prepared to disseminate copies to the members of the Deputies' Meeting when you give the word.

SIGNED R. L. Bannerman

R. L. Bannerman  
Deputy Director  
for Support

Att.

DD/S:RLB:ksb (19 Nov 69)

Distribution:

- Orig - Adse w/att
- 1 - ER
- X - DD/S Subject w/att & w/background
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12 November 1969

## The Career Training Program - A Proposal

### I. Purpose

The Career Training Program has as its purpose the selection, training, and early career development of young professional officers who show unusual potential for outstanding service as Agency careerists. The Program seeks to select annually not more than 50 candidates with broad interests and the potential for successful performance in several different categories of Agency endeavor. This Program is intended to supplement, and not supplant, the Agency's direct hiring of professional specialists.

### II. Management

Responsibility for the selection, training, initial placement, and early career development of Career Trainees is vested by the Director of Central Intelligence, through the Deputy Director for Support, in the Director of Training, who receives policy guidance from, and consults with, the Executive Director-Comptroller and the several Deputy Directors. The Deputy Directors are responsible for assigning to the Career Training Staff officers well-qualified to represent them in the tasks of selecting, evaluating, counseling, and assigning junior careerists. Such assignments should be of a rotational nature.

### III. Operation

#### A. Selection

1. Responsibility - Selection is made by the Career Training Staff of the Office of Training, in cooperation with the Office of Personnel, from among highly promising external applicants and outstanding junior personnel already on duty in the Agency.

2. Criteria - Primary emphasis is placed on personal characteristics, including intellectual ability and its effective use; previous achievement in academic, vocational and other endeavors; integrity;

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evidence of potential leadership; adaptability and versatility; motivation to national service and the intelligence profession; and a demonstrable interest and personal involvement in world affairs or public administration. In practice, it is normal for a candidate to have a bachelor's degree or its equivalent in related experience. Secondary emphasis is placed on educational specialization and an individual's immediate suitability for a particular job.

3. Candidate Sources - Criteria enumerated above are applied to internal and external candidates alike without pre-determined ratio, to assure only that candidates selected from either source are of exceptional caliber.

#### IV. Appointment Grades and Promotion Policy

A. The Program normally selects candidates at the GS-9 or -10 levels, depending on the candidates' qualifications. Those selected at these grades become eligible for promotion to the next higher grade approximately nine months after commencing formal training in the Program, subject to satisfactory performance. They become eligible for a second promotion approximately one year from date of the first, again subject to satisfactory performance.

B. In cases of extraordinary qualifications, candidates may be selected at the GS-11 or -12 levels but no assurances can be given about eligibility for promotion beyond GS-12.

C. Promotions are not automatic; they must be earned through effective performance. Changes in a trainee's personal circumstances which serve to delay his training or career development also may affect his promotion eligibility.

D. The promotion policy in effect at the time each group of Career Trainees is selected will apply to that group so long as it is on the current roster of the Program. It is essential that promotion policy for Career Trainees be observed uniformly throughout the Agency.

#### V. Training

##### A. Basic

All Career Trainees are enrolled in a basic training cycle designed to familiarize them with current and projected world problems; the role of the U.S. in world affairs and its international activities; the purpose

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and framework of intelligence functions; and the responsibilities and functions of the Central Intelligence Agency. This cycle is presently twelve weeks long but may be modified as developments make appropriate. In this basic stage attention is given to identifying a student's interest in a specific line of work as well as determining his skills and aptitudes. This basic cycle currently is offered to Career Trainees exclusively, but in the longer run the Office of Training will attempt to assimilate Career Trainees and non-Career Trainees to the greatest extent possible.

#### B. Interim On-the-Job Assignments

1. An essential element of the Program is to extend trainee familiarization and appreciation of the variety of Agency functions and to stimulate career motivation. Consequently, upon successful completion of basic training, Career Trainees normally are placed on two successive interim assignments not to exceed three months' duration each. Such assignments, wherever feasible, should be in essentially different types of work, either in different Directorates or certainly in different components within the same Directorate. In some cases, TDY assignments overseas may be appropriate to the extent that they are neither premature, in terms of trainee qualifications, nor compromise purposeful career development.

2. Interim assignments are developed by the Career Training Staff, in consultation with officials in operating components, to broaden and enhance a particular trainee's qualifications. In effecting these assignments, it is the Staff's responsibility to confer personally with the trainee's projected supervisor to acquaint him with the trainee's background and to fix upon a planned use of him allowing for some degree of responsible work and providing a basis for evaluation of his performance. Success in this depends upon the degree to which supervisors accept the responsibility to ensure meaningful and challenging experiences that have a positive impact on trainee motivation.

### VI. Early Career Development

#### A. Determination of Career Direction

With findings in mind from the trainees' basic training and interim assignment performances, a determination is made by the Career Training Staff, in consultation with the trainee, about the most appropriate

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career projection (Directorate) for each trainee. Specific preparation for such career then is begun by resort to advanced training or full-time on-the-job assignment in whichever sequence is appropriate to the particular case.

B. Advanced Training

1. Advanced training is designed to develop and improve skills for application in clandestine operations; intelligence collation, analysis and production; support functions; or other pertinent types of work. Agency training courses given as part of the Program at this stage of development range in duration from six weeks to six months depending on the type of preparation required.

2. The principal ingredient of this phase is enrollment of the trainee in one or more of the advanced courses, as appropriate; Operations Course I (and possibly II), Intelligence Production, or Support Services. Effort is made to enroll the trainee, whenever practicable, in advanced course work at such time as he will be able to apply the training as soon as possible after completion. In cases where the trainee does not receive such training during the period of his formal enrollment in the Program, it becomes the responsibility of the operating component to which he is assigned to arrange such training at the appropriate time.

3. Additional training which is desired by an operating component but is not formally included in the Career Training Program, e.g., course work at outside institutions, language training, or other Office of Training courses, may be arranged in consultation with the Career Training Staff.

C. Initial Full-Time Assignment

1. Once the Career Trainee has successfully completed sufficient training to satisfy requirements for his being assigned, a representative of the Staff confers with officials of an appropriate Career Service or operating component to determine the particular assignment which would best match the trainee's qualifications with the component's need for junior officers.

2. An essential element in the effective implementation of a proper assignment for the trainee is personal consultation between the Staff representative and the projected supervisor. The Career Training Staff

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representative is charged, first, with providing pertinent information and discussing the trainee's evaluative records with the supervisor, and second, with devising together with the supervisor a two- or three-year use and development plan for the trainee, including where feasible additional internal and external training.

3. In some instances, advanced training will take place prior to the trainee's being assigned, and in other instances it may be deferred to a more appropriate time.

D. Monitoring the Assignment

1. The trainee normally remains in Career Trainee status during the first year of his initial assignment. During this time both the supervisor and the trainee provide to the Career Training Staff periodic progress reports from which judgment may be made about his effectiveness and his suitability for career development in the parent component. Adjustments can be made as dictated by circumstances and after discussions with interested officials. These adjustments include modification of assignment, remedial training, reassignment within the component or elsewhere in the Agency, or separation from the Agency.

2. If by the end of one year there is mutual satisfaction with the assignment and the proposed development of the trainee, he is transferred from the Career Training Program into a regular Career Service for further development as a professional officer.

3. Thereafter, the Career Training Program is provided for a period of three years with copies of personnel actions relating to the former trainee, copies of his Fitness Reports, and other information which can be used to evaluate and guide the Program's efforts to select, train, counsel, and assign new trainees. In addition, the Office of Training is authorized to solicit and receive feedback from former trainees, as well as other students, to assess the validity of its training programs.

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Approved For Release 2003/04/29 : CIA-RDP84-00780R003100130003-3

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CMS m69-0097

19 OCT 1969

DDIS 69-4703

FILE Training 3-1

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Support

SUBJECT : The Career Training Program

REFERENCE : Memo for DD/S, dated 7 July 1969, from Director of Training  
Subject: Same as above

1. As requested by your office, a brief discussion was held with the Director of each of the offices of the DD/S. This memorandum presents therefore, a summary of their opinions concerning the essential aspects of the CT Program as it pertains to the Support Directorate. The general curriculum, specific courses contained and duration of training were areas not covered.

2. The expansion of the CT Program in FY 1967 and FY 1968 to 275 trainees per year created a number of problems in terms of training, placement, evaluation and supervision. These were covered rather completely in Mr. Cunningham's memorandum and need not be reiterated here. However, it is pertinent to point out the concern of the offices concerning the assignment of career trainees on a "quota" basis and in numbers that could not be absorbed or managed adequately on a long-term basis. Certainly the size of the CT Program should be reduced considerably from this 275 per year figure.

3. Further, several offices favored greater input to the program from employees already on duty. Internal selection would permit basic office training to be completed before the employee, as a CT, considers himself above the range of fundamental component orientation. It would at the same time also provide a greater degree of career incentive for current employees who have already demonstrated their Agency interest and motivation through several years of employment. This opinion may also be valid for other Directorates.

4. Within the DD/S we are providing specific services, some rather technical in nature, to support the over-all mission and activities of the Agency. Skilled professionals are required if we are to discharge our responsibilities effectively. In general, we are looking for career trainees who possess more than the native qualities of leadership, aptitude, motivation, intellectual ability and versatility. In addition to these attributes, we are looking for individuals with education background or related experience to meet the specific requirements of the Support Directorate offices. And, as a more immediate goal, we are looking for the leadership or managerial potential to the Division or Branch Chief level. The ability of these individuals to reach the more Senior Staff level positions will be surfaced or can be developed in direct proportion to their demonstrated potential.

Group 1 - Excluded from Automatic Downgrading and Declassification

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Approved For Release 2003/04/29 : CIA-RDP84-00780R003100130003-3

5. While the specialist was highly favored as a candidate over the generalist, the assignment of a limited number of generalists was acceptable. Precise numbers for each office was not discussed, although I believe, one or two should be the limit.

6. A college degree was basically accepted as a requirement for the CT Program, although there was discussion on this point in view of some apparently qualified employees who do not have degrees.

7. The present practice of recruiting at the GS-08 or GS-09 level with periodic promotions to GS-10 and GS-11 is considered appropriate. There is some concern, however, in that reductions under BALPA and OPRÉD make placement difficult and the periodic promotions accorded the career trainees restricts the promotion possibilities of other employees who are both qualified and deserving. Understandably, the point was made that if the CT is nominated by an office and returned to that office after training, this concern is essentially dispelled.

8. There was agreement that at some point in the CT's career, he must become competitive with other employees for both assignments and promotions. The GS-11 level appeared to be the logical point in time. His initial component assignment will have been made and the promotions initiated by the SJ career service will have been completed.

9. In some respects, the timing of promotions relates to the duration of training. Validation of performance by OTR while the CT is in training justifies their promotion recommendation. It would appear that after the CT has been assigned, further promotion recommendations originated by the SJ career service should be coordinated with the office concerned to validate performance in a working environment.

10. The following recommendations are submitted for your consideration at this time. As the review of the CT Program progresses and areas of training, placement and post-training evaluation are more definitively explored, additional recommendations will be forwarded.

A. The DD/S endorse the position that the size of the CT Program be reduced. I would suggest a range of 60-80 per year.

B. The selection of candidates for the CT Program should include a greater percentage of internals particularly during the period of position reductions.

C. The selection criteria for the CT Program should be firmly established (and provided to Office Heads for guidance in nominating internals).

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D. The career trainees assigned to the Support Directorate should for the most part be skilled professionals. A limited number of generalists can be accommodated.

E. The career trainee candidates should enter the program at the GS-08/9 level and follow a uniform promotion policy. The SJ career service should initiate promotions through the GS-11 level. Coordination with the office concerned should be effected if the CT has been assigned.

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Chief, Career Management  
and Training Staff, OC

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15 OCT 1969

DD1569-4703

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Chief, Career Management  
and Training Staff, OC


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28 July 1969



Mr. Goffey




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**FILE** *Training 3-1*

The attached was presented by Mr. Cunningham -- though not exactly in its present form -- at the Deputies' Meeting. In point of fact, Hugh's comments seem to focus upon three possibilities: (a) abolish the CT Program; (b) totally restructure the CT Program; (c) keep CT Program "as it is, but with changes."

Everybody agreed that there is certainly a need for a new statement of concept/criteria and also which ever way the Program goes, there must be a great reduction in the numbers of "externals."

The subject ~~evidently~~ evidently closed with "direction" to Hugh Cunningham to write up a single proposal (evidently Hugh is the one charged with making the firm recommendation for one of the alternatives - (a), (b), or (c) - noted above).

Each of the DD's is then to appoint a man who will work with Hugh on "perfecting or implementing the proposal." (Note: this last underscoring is mine -- because I don't think it was really clear whether Hugh plus the DD men or Hugh alone would prepare a single proposal for review.)



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Remarks:

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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
O/EXDIR	28 July

Approved For Release 2003/04/29 : CIA-RDP84-00780R003100130003-

MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel White

Attached is Mr. Cunningham's summary of problems in the Career Training Program. It is suggested that this be placed before the Deputies' Meeting of 23 July. If you concur I will have copies made and circulated to the attendees at the Deputies' Meeting.

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R. L. Bannerman

*8 July 69*  
(DATE)


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DD/S advised

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69-3/33

3 JUL 1969



MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Support

SUBJECT : The Career Training Program

1. This memorandum summarizes some of the problems of the Career Training Program in a manner intended to be suitable for discussion by Colonel White and the Deputy Directors.

#### Introduction


2. Over the years the Career Training Program has developed serious problems of purpose, scope, and management which require fundamental rethinking. The Office of Training is at work on such a study, and will eventually propose important revisions of nearly all aspects of the Program. Some of these will concern the content, duration, and timing of courses. Others will require Agency-wide understanding of the ways in which changing Agency needs and practices have altered the circumstances in which the Program operates. The most important of these problems are identified in what follows, in the hope that discussion at the top of the Agency will furnish a practical new basis for the Office of Training's further study and recommendations.

#### Basic Concept

3. There is no longer a basic concept for the Program which is uniformly accepted within the Agency. The simple, broad definition of the Program's purpose in [ ] was adequate until about 1965: It was to be "one means of...selecting and preparing highly qualified young men and women for professional careers in the Agency." That this objective was achieved in the early years is demonstrable from the performance of many products of the Program. One is a GS-17 and head of an Office, another has been the Director's Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs, another is Chief of the Estimates Staff; at least seven are supergrades, 10 are GS-15s, 63 are GS-14s, a good many have been station chiefs or held other positions of comparable responsibility, 64 have been assigned to the Midcareer Executive Development Course, and 21 have been selected for one or another of the senior service colleges or other types of external training of comparable distinction.

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4. Then expansion over several years swelled the ranks of Trainees past the number that can have any hope of rising to senior positions. Since 1951 a total of [ ] Trainees have entered the Program; of these [ ] have entered since 1 January 1965 [ ] from outside the Agency [ ] from inside). Some [ ] are now on duty. It is no longer clear what either the Agency or the individual Trainee can realistically expect. A disparity of views as to the Program's purposes has been widening for several years. Significant numbers of officers at all levels and in all components now look to the Program to serve one or another of the following functions:

a. to provide carefully selected and trained young professional officers of top talent, suitable for development as leaders in one or another field of activity as their individual aptitudes and the Agency's changing needs would make appropriate--in short, potential generalists;

b. to be a source of young officers for the bulk of junior professional positions, recruited for skills and experience already acquired--in short, specialists;

c. to serve as an employee pool from which to satisfy crash personnel requirements without regard to long-term career considerations;

d. to provide status and training to young professional and semi-professional employees who have performed well and plan to stay in the Agency;

e. to provide an administrative mechanism to rechannel young employees from one component to another or to afford staff status to contract personnel who have served the Agency well.

5. To some extent the Program has become a victim of its earlier successes. Some fairly senior officers have allowed the false notion to arise that no-one outside the Program can hope to advance. (Recent controversies over the exclusion of some internal applicants and contract employees, causing much ill feeling and even some resignations, can be traced to this damaging misconception.) Expansion since 1965 inevitably brought some decline in quality--not in those qualifications that can be measured, such as education, but in intangibles like motivation, intellectual curiosity, and eagerness to learn. Training which

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was once suitable for a fairly homogeneous group is less and less appropriate for an agglomeration of specialists earmarked very early for one Office or Directorate and no other. Pressures of workload and disparities of view as to function have kept OTR from adapting its courses enough to keep up with the changing situation, especially as to who gets what training and for how long. The large numbers of Trainees, colliding with obstacles like BALPA, have made placement more difficult and dashed the hopes of those bright young people now two or three years out of training. The number and rate of resignations have been rising, especially among those placed in routine jobs with little challenge and no prospect of change or of advancement beyond GS-11. We have to ask ourselves whether the confusion and turmoil surrounding the very concept of the Career Training Program are not tending to drive out the Trainees with gumption and ambition, and to leave with us those who are satisfied to become good gray bureaucrats.

#### Criteria for Selection

6. For years the Program looked most of all for native qualities of personality, intellectual ability, aptitude, motivation, temperament, versatility, adaptability, and potential leadership. [ ] published on 22 November 1963 (of all unhappy days), is still in effect though revision has been in process for several years. It sets only these minimum criteria: "...a candidate must have a college education or, in the case of on-duty personnel, its equivalent in experience....The candidate must also be qualified to undertake assignments of any degree of sensitivity and be medically qualified for full duty/general." 25

7. The decision to enlarge the Program to 275 Trainees per year for FY 1967 and FY 1968 necessarily represented a shift of emphasis. Since the Agency now looked to the Program to fill many more junior slots in a way that would get its current work done, with less attention to future developments, there had to be more emphasis on finding candidates who already had a high degree of specific skill. This trend became even more pronounced when in early 1968 the Program was severely cut back because of BALPA and related stringencies. In general, Trainees were by now recruited not so much for their long-range potential as to fill specific current requirements. For FY 1970 the Directorate of Support wants three investigators, five technicians, three lawyers, eight business or accounting majors, and nine Support generalists. The Directorate of Intelligence wants mostly MAs in ten specified fields or bachelors' degrees in certain sciences, engineering, or mathematics.

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The Clandestine Service has many fewer possible openings than before, but has fairly recently argued that the tighter personnel situation requires an upgrading of standards, and therefore stipulates that henceforth Trainees should hold advanced degrees (mostly MAs in various area studies) and present either an intermediate knowledge of some language or a high aptitude for languages. All these developments have made it expedient to move all the way back to the initial interview the decision as to which Directorate a Trainee would join, and to reach that decision before his own acquaintance with the Agency and his performance in training can help influence the assignment. In so doing we have abandoned what used to be one of the most successful features of the Program. Instead, we now give training of which a good deal is entirely inappropriate (for example, the Ops Familiarization Course for Trainees already slated for the DDI), and increase the dissatisfaction of the Trainees with the rigidity of both training schedules and placement.

8. In a meeting on 6 November 1968 the Director emphasized his own continuing interest in the Program. He underlined the necessity of selecting only the best (now made easier by the new restriction on numbers), but instead of concentrating on advanced degrees, he expressed a criterion more nearly like that of earlier years. To quote from Mr. Wattles's memorandum of the same day to his recruiters, Mr. Helms "has in effect directed that applicants selected for the Program have demonstrated by experience, interest, academic focus, or by any other means you can think of a true, real interest in other countries and the international affairs of the United States." This seems to come closer to the old concern for personal attributes than to the new emphasis on graduate degrees and special skills.

9. If we are to return to choosing young people primarily for promise, character, personality, and above all motivation for Intelligence as a career and a profession, then we must be ready later on to provide them with the special skills the Agency will eventually require of them. An interesting evidence that this is possible is to be seen in OER's practice of sending junior officers to the Foreign Service Institute's intensive course in economics. But if skills are to be the most important criteria, then the whole Program ought to be drastically revised, or even abolished: Recruitment, training, and placement cannot be effectively managed centrally by a Program designed for a quite different purpose. In particular, the effort to manage these functions centrally for large groups requires more precise forecasting of vacancies than can be handled by a Program which requires up to two years'

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lead-time, and the whole process is more vulnerable to every twist and turn in budgetary and personnel considerations than it would be if it were divided among the Directorates. Meanwhile, if we keep on trying to find both high motivation for an Intelligence career and the impressive graduate degrees, we shall keep on finding that they do not often exist in the same person to a degree that will satisfy the Agency. Advanced degrees are highly salable commodities in a highly competitive market, and it is no wonder that recent graduates tend to look on CIA as just one more job opportunity like many others.

10. My own tentative recommendation is to return to the old concept and leave the recruiting of already trained specialists to the Directorates. It would be a great loss if the Agency did not try to keep on finding young people of high general promise, introduce them to the work of the Agency as a whole, and gradually identify through training the interests and aptitudes which would fit them especially for one line of work or another. Without such a Program we would lose a valuable means of emphasizing the Agency's essential unity of function, and would instead encourage a segregation into tribes speaking different tongues. That danger is already present among us, and we need every means we can devise to ward it off. I believe we could manage a small Program to this end without creating the old bugaboo of an elite corps; at the same time managers throughout the Agency could recruit and develop the large numbers of junior professionals they need in addition to those the Program could supply.

#### Pay and Advancement

11. Career Trainees as a group present two special problems, especially when we require those highly salable graduate degrees:

a. The Agency's starting salaries and promotion policies for Trainees are not even competitive with those elsewhere in the Government, much less with those in business. The Management Intern Program of the Civil Service Commission starts young officers at GS-09 and promotes them to GS-11 after one year, to GS-12 a year later, and to GS-13 eighteen months after that. The FBI starts its agents at GS-10. Foreign Service Officers accept low pay and slow advancement at first because of the high rewards in prospect; the State Department has many more FSO-1s than CIA has GS-18s, not to mention the hundred-odd ambassadorships. By contrast, the CIA practice of starting many Trainees at GS-07 or GS-08, and advancing them one grade at a time, makes recruitment of the best talents steadily

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more difficult; even the lesser talents can find higher pay and quicker advancement elsewhere, as many exit interviews attest. This fact reinforces the point about criteria for selection: We must find the bright young man early, before he has that graduate degree, and bring him up the way he should go. The education we complete for him after that can deepen his commitment to the intelligence profession.

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15. The first question is how many and what kinds of Trainees the Agency can use in challenging assignments. We await Mr. Wattles's study of resignations with great interest, but we already know that lack of challenge is a frequent cause of resignation among Trainees who have been in the Agency for several years. Just as some young professionals outside the Program imagine that they are therefore second-class citizens, so some Trainees get the same impression about themselves. It is regrettably true, for example, that they see a great difference in prestige and prospects for advancement between the "production" Offices of the DDI and the Offices which perform services for the producers. In Support and the Clandestine Service they do not seem to be prepared for the great amount of humdrum work like name-tracing and security checks, and tend to judge their prospects by the speed with which they can get overseas. Some of this unreality stems from offhand inattention on the part of their supervisors. But phrases like "too little work to do," "too little responsibility," "bureaucracy and overstaffing" recur with discouraging frequency in the exit interviews.

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a. We could confirm or refute the hypothesis that the Agency is overlooking a prime source of undeveloped talent. The one-to-three ratio and the manner in which internal applications are controlled by the Directorates prevent us from testing that possibility.

b. Concentrating on this source of supply, conveniently at hand for extensive interviewing and study, might help us all to narrow our differences as to the most effective criteria for selection. [ ] specifically encourages on-duty personnel to apply for the Program, but some components set up more obstacles than others; we might lessen this disparity.

c. While we were sorting out our criteria OTR could be adapting its training program. This slow step-by-step process could be speeded somewhat by concentrating on the training needed by people who have been in the Agency for some time, while revising the elements of training most needed by new externals.

d. We could give useful new attention to on-the-job training (also required by [ ] incidentally), which in recent years has fallen into disrepair. Two years ago the Program lost the post-training period of six months, which had been used to determine the Trainees' suitability for their projected assignments, and also lost the 13-week on-the-job training between courses. Nowadays we hear considerable griping from Trainees about pre-training and interim on-the-job assignments: unplanned, pointless, even menial.

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\* \* \* \* \*

18. My own conclusion is that the principal recent problem of the Program, and the one which created or intensified most of the others, has been its inflated size. That difficulty is being corrected, but perhaps we ought to go further. At any rate, now is the time to examine all our assumptions, expectations, and practices. The Office of Training will welcome whatever practical guidance from the top this catalogue of problems can elicit. These problems are small compared with some the Agency created for itself in the past: It is somewhat comforting to compare them with those of another Program ("Mobilization," 1951), which directed the training staff to prepare to take on 300 Trainees per month, for a total of 900 at any one time--and eventually 18 turned up. We have come a long way.

  
HUGH T. CUNNINGHAM  
Director of Training

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Colonel White

Attached is Mr. Cunningham's summary of problems in the Career Training Program. It is suggested that this be placed before the Deputies' Meeting of 23 July. If you concur I will have copies made and circulated to the attendees at the Deputies' Meeting.

SIGNED R. L. Bannerman

R. L. Bannerman  
8 JUL 1969

DD/S:RLB:ksd (8 July 69)

Distribution:

Orig - Adse w/att (DD/S 69-3133)

2 - DD/S Subject w/copy DD/S 69-3133

1 - DD/S Chrono

DD/S 69-3133: Memo dtd 3 July 69 for DD/S fr DTR, subj: The Career Training Program

Director of Personnel  
5 E-56 Hqs.

Attached is a copy of Hugh Cunningham's report on the Career Training Program. I have sent copies to the Executive Director proposing that this be put on the Deputies' agenda. Please control this report until I hear from the Executive Director that he accepts it as an agenda item.

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R. L. Bannerman

8 JUL 1969

Deputy Director for Support 7 D-26 Hqs.

Distribution:

Orig - Adse w/copy DD/S 69-3133

X - DD/S Subject w/kp 225 69.3.33

1 - DD/S Chrono

DD/S 69-3133: Memo dtd 3 July 69 for DD/S fr DTR, subj: The Career Training Program

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03 JUL 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Support

SUBJECT : The Career Training Program

1. This memorandum summarizes some of the problems of the Career Training Program in a manner intended to be suitable for discussion by Colonel White and the Deputy Directors.

### Introduction

2. Over the years the Career Training Program has developed serious problems of purpose, scope, and management which require fundamental rethinking. The Office of Training is at work on such a study, and will eventually propose important revisions of nearly all aspects of the Program. Some of these will concern the content, duration, and timing of courses. Others will require Agency-wide understanding of the ways in which changing Agency needs and practices have altered the circumstances in which the Program operates. The most important of these problems are identified in what follows, in the hope that discussion at the top of the Agency will furnish a practical new basis for the Office of Training's further study and recommendations.

### Basic Concept

3. There is no longer a basic concept for the Program which is uniformly accepted within the Agency. The simple, broad definition of the Program's purpose in [ ] was adequate until about 1965: It was to be "one means of...selecting and preparing highly qualified young men and women for professional careers in the Agency." That this objective was achieved in the early years is demonstrable from the performance of many products of the Program. One is a GS-17 and head of an Office, another has been the Director's Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs, another is Chief of the Estimates Staff; at least seven are supergrades, 10 are GS-15s, 63 are GS-14s, a good many have been station chiefs or held other positions of comparable responsibility, 64 have been assigned to the Midcareer Executive Development Course, and 21 have been selected for one or another of the senior service colleges or other types of external training of comparable distinction.

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GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

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25X9 4. Then expansion over several years swelled the ranks of Trainees  
25X9 past the number that can have any hope of rising to senior positions. Since  
25X9 1951 a total of [ ] Trainees have entered the Program; of these [ ] have  
entered since 1 January 1965 [ ] from outside the Agency, [ ] from inside).  
Some [ ] are now on duty. It is no longer clear what either the Agency or  
the individual Trainee can realistically expect. A disparity of views as to  
the Program's purposes has been widening for several years. Significant  
numbers of officers at all levels and in all components now look to the Pro-  
gram to serve one or another of the following functions:

a. to provide carefully selected and trained young professional officers of top talent, suitable for development as leaders in one or another field of activity as their individual aptitudes and the Agency's changing needs would make appropriate--in short, potential generalists;

b. to be a source of young officers for the bulk of junior professional positions, recruited for skills and experience already acquired--in short, specialists;

c. to serve as an employee pool from which to satisfy crash personnel requirements without regard to long-term career considerations;

d. to provide status and training to young professional and semi-professional employees who have performed well and plan to stay in the Agency;

e. to provide an administrative mechanism to rechannel young employees from one component to another or to afford staff status to contract personnel who have served the Agency well.

5. To some extent the Program has become a victim of its earlier successes. Some fairly senior officers have allowed the false notion to arise that no-one outside the Program can hope to advance. (Recent controversies over the exclusion of some internal applicants and contract employees, causing much ill feeling and even some resignations, can be traced to this damaging misconception.) Expansion since 1965 inevitably brought some decline in quality--not in those qualifications that can be measured, such as education, but in intangibles like motivation, intellectual curiosity, and eagerness to learn. Training which

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was once suitable for a fairly homogeneous group is less and less appropriate for an agglomeration of specialists earmarked very early for one Office or Directorate and no other. Pressures of workload and disparities of view as to function have kept OTR from adapting its courses enough to keep up with the changing situation, especially as to who gets what training and for how long. The large numbers of Trainees, colliding with obstacles like BALPA, have made placement more difficult and dashed the hopes of those bright young people now two or three years out of training. The number and rate of resignations have been rising, especially among those placed in routine jobs with little challenge and no prospect of change or of advancement beyond GS-11. We have to ask ourselves whether the confusion and turmoil surrounding the very concept of the Career Training Program are not tending to drive out the Trainees with gumption and ambition, and to leave with us those who are satisfied to become good gray bureaucrats.

#### Criteria for Selection

6. For years the Program looked most of all for native qualities of personality, intellectual ability, aptitude, motivation, temperament, versatility, adaptability, and potential leadership. [ ] published on 22 November 1963 (of all unhappy days), is still in effect though revision has been in process for several years. It sets only these minimum criteria: "...a candidate must have a college education or, in the case of on-duty personnel, its equivalent in experience....The candidate must also be qualified to undertake assignments of any degree of sensitivity and be medically qualified for full duty/general."

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7. The decision to enlarge the Program to 275 Trainees per year for FY 1967 and FY 1968 necessarily represented a shift of emphasis. Since the Agency now looked to the Program to fill many more junior slots in a way that would get its current work done, with less attention to future developments, there had to be more emphasis on finding candidates who already had a high degree of specific skill. This trend became even more pronounced when in early 1968 the Program was severely cut back because of BALPA and related stringencies. In general, Trainees were by now recruited not so much for their long-range potential as to fill specific current requirements. For FY 1970 the Directorate of Support wants three investigators, five technicians, three lawyers, eight business or accounting majors, and nine Support generalists. The Directorate of Intelligence wants mostly MAs in ten specified fields or bachelors' degrees in certain sciences, engineering, or mathematics.

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The Clandestine Service has many fewer possible openings than before, but has fairly recently argued that the tighter personnel situation requires an upgrading of standards, and therefore stipulates that henceforth Trainees should hold advanced degrees (mostly MAs in various area studies) and present either an intermediate knowledge of some language or a high aptitude for languages. All these developments have made it expedient to move all the way back to the initial interview the decision as to which Directorate a Trainee would join, and to reach that decision before his own acquaintance with the Agency and his performance in training can help influence the assignment. In so doing we have abandoned what used to be one of the most successful features of the Program. Instead, we now give training of which a good deal is entirely inappropriate (for example, the Ops Familiarization Course for Trainees already slated for the DDI), and increase the dissatisfaction of the Trainees with the rigidity of both training schedules and placement.

8. In a meeting on 6 November 1968 the Director emphasized his own continuing interest in the Program. He underlined the necessity of selecting only the best (now made easier by the new restriction on numbers), but instead of concentrating on advanced degrees, he expressed a criterion more nearly like that of earlier years. To quote from Mr. Wattle's memorandum of the same day to his recruiters, Mr. Helms "has in effect directed that applicants selected for the Program have demonstrated by experience, interest, academic focus, or by any other means you can think of a true, real interest in other countries and the international affairs of the United States." This seems to come closer to the old concern for personal attributes than to the new emphasis on graduate degrees and special skills.

9. If we are to return to choosing young people primarily for promise, character, personality, and above all motivation for Intelligence as a career and a profession, then we must be ready later on to provide them with the special skills the Agency will eventually require of them. An interesting evidence that this is possible is to be seen in OER's practice of sending junior officers to the Foreign Service Institute's intensive course in economics. But if skills are to be the most important criteria, then the whole Program ought to be drastically revised, or even abolished: Recruitment, training, and placement cannot be effectively managed centrally by a Program designed for a quite different purpose. In particular, the effort to manage these functions centrally for large groups requires more precise forecasting of vacancies than can be handled by a Program which requires up to two years'

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lead-time, and the whole process is more vulnerable to every twist and turn in budgetary and personnel considerations than it would be if it were divided among the Directorates. Meanwhile, if we keep on trying to find both high motivation for an Intelligence career and the impressive graduate degrees, we shall keep on finding that they do not often exist in the same person to a degree that will satisfy the Agency. Advanced degrees are highly salable commodities in a highly competitive market, and it is no wonder that recent graduates tend to look on CIA as just one more job opportunity like many others.

10. My own tentative recommendation is to return to the old concept and leave the recruiting of already trained specialists to the Directorates. It would be a great loss if the Agency did not try to keep on finding young people of high general promise, introduce them to the work of the Agency as a whole, and gradually identify through training the interests and aptitudes which would fit them especially for one line of work or another. Without such a Program we would lose a valuable means of emphasizing the Agency's essential unity of function, and would instead encourage a segregation into tribes speaking different tongues. That danger is already present among us, and we need every means we can devise to ward it off. I believe we could manage a small Program to this end without creating the old bugaboo of an elite corps; at the same time managers throughout the Agency could recruit and develop the large numbers of junior professionals they need in addition to those the Program could supply.

#### Pay and Advancement

11. Career Trainees as a group present two special problems, especially when we require those highly salable graduate degrees:

a. The Agency's starting salaries and promotion policies for Trainees are not even competitive with those elsewhere in the Government, much less with those in business. The Management Intern Program of the Civil Service Commission starts young officers at GS-09 and promotes them to GS-11 after one year, to GS-12 a year later, and to GS-13 eighteen months after that. The FBI starts its agents at GS-10. Foreign Service Officers accept low pay and slow advancement at first because of the high rewards in prospect; the State Department has many more FSO-1s than CIA has GS-18s, not to mention the hundred-odd ambassadorships. By contrast, the CIA practice of starting many Trainees at GS-07 or GS-08, and advancing them one grade at a time, makes recruitment of the best talents steadily

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


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